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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY l\L BIRD, 
Petit iunrr and Appellant, 
vs. 
OLIVE SORENSON, 
( ~ity Recorder, 
Respondent, 
HAROLD L. WELCH and 
DEE GLEN SMITH, 
Intervenors and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10050 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to obtain a writ of mandamus com-
pelling respondent Olive Sorenson, City Reootder, of 
Washington Terrace, Utah, to perfonn the duties s~t 
forth in Title 20, Chapter 11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
in connection with referendum proceedings as they relate 
to a zoning ordinance passed by the City Council of 
\Y ashington Terrace rezoning residential property to 
conunercial property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed appellant's petition for a 
writ of mandamus upon the ground that a zoning ordin-
ance reclassifying property from a Residential Zone 
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R-2 to a Commercial Zone C-2 is an administrative act 
and not subjec-t to referendum proceedings (R. 8 & 13). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order vacating the trial 
court's order dis1nissing appellant's petition for a writ 
of mandamus and for an order directing the trial court to 
issue a writ of mandamus directed to respondent Olive 
Sorsenson as per the prayer in appellant's petition 
(R. 4). 
STATEl\IENr:t, OF FACTS 
The appellant is a resident, taxpayer and legally 
qualified elector of the City of Washington Terrace, 
Utah, (R. 4 & 10). Respondent Olive Sorenson is the 
City Recorder of Washington Terrace and respondents 
Harold L. Welch and Dee Glen Smith have contingent 
interests in the property which is the subject of the 
zoning ordinance under consideration (R. 4, 10 and 
Answer In Intervention). 
On November 14, 1963, the City Council of Washing-
ton Terrace passed a zoning ordinance re-zoning Resi-
. dential R-2 property to Commercial C-2 property which 
appellant and others desire to have submitted to a vote 
of the electors of the City by way of referendum pro-
ceedings (R. 4 & 10). 
On November 27, 1963, appellant tendered to re-
spondent Olive Sorenson an application for petition 
copies, a check for $10.00, a copy of the proposed petition 
for referendum, and five copies of said ordinance passed 
by the City Council of Washington Terrace. Respondent 
refused to accept said papers or do any of the duties 
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required by Title 20, Chapter 11, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as thr~· relate to referendu1n proceedings (R.4, 10 
nnd Exhibit A). 
Appellant and others caused copies of the petition 
for referendtun and eirculation sheets to be printed and 
circulated among the qualified electors of said City 
for signatures (R. 4, 10 &Exhibit C). 
The petition sections were then delivered to the 
Weber County Clerk who certified that 493 qualified 
voters had signed the said petition sections (R. 4 & 
Exhibit B). 
On Dece1nber 11, 1963, appellant again tendered to 
respondent Olive Sorenson all documents and papers 
previously tendered on Novmnber 27, 1963, and also 
tendered the original petition and five petition sec-
tions with the signatures of the electors together with 
the letter of certification from the Weber County Clerk 
which were all refused by respondent (R. 4 & 10). 
Appellant then filed her petition for a writ of man-
damus and a hearing was had thereon ( R. 12). Re-
spondents Harold L. vVelch and Dee Glen Smith were 
allowed to intervene. The parties then stipulated that 
the matter may be heard on the pleadings as a law 
question and after argument, the trial court ordered 
appellant's petition dismissed on the ground that a 
zoning ordinance reclassifying residential property to 
commercial property is an administrative act and not 
subject to referendum proceedings (R. 8 & 13). 
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ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISl\fiSSING AP-
PELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
MANDAI\lUS, IN THAT A ZONING ORDI-
NANCE RECLASSIFYING P R 0 P E, R T Y 
FROM A RESIDENTIAL ZONE R-2 TO A 
COl\1:MERCIAL ZONE C-2 IS THE PROPER 
SUBJE1CT OF REFERENDUM: PROCEED-
INGS. 
In deciding whether or not a zoning ordinance re-
classifying property from residential to commercial is 
the proper subject of referendum proceedings, Article 
VI, Section I of the Constitution of Utah, is material 
and provides that the legal voters of any legal subdi-
vision of the State 1nay cause any desired legislation 
to be submitted to a vote of the people of said subdi-
vision for approval or rejection, or may require any 
law or ordinance passed by the law-making body to be 
submitted to the voters thereof before such law or ordi-
nance shall take effect. 
Also material to this issue is Section 20-11-21, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"Direct legislation in cities and towns -- Subject 
to the provisions of this cha per, legal voters of 
any city or town, in such numbers as herein re-
quired may initiate any desired legislation and 
cause the same to be submitted to the law-making 
body, or to a vote of the people of such city or 
town for approval or rejection, or may require 
any law or ordinance passed by the law-making 
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body of such city or town to be submitted to the 
voters thereof before such law or ordinance shall 
take effect." 
Even though tl1e foregoing constitutional and 
~tatutory provisions seen1 to indicate that any law or 
ordinance is subject to referendu1n, the courts, including 
this juri~<liction, have placed a lilnitation on this lang-
uage by holding that only legislative acts are the subject 
of referendtun proceedings and not administrative acts. 
In the case of Keigley et al. v. Bench, City ReconLT, 
97 U. 69, 89 P. 2d 480, this court indicated at page 484 
of the opinion, that the test of whether an ordinance 
was legislative or ad1ninistrative is whether the ordin-
ance is one n1aking a new law, or one executing a law 
already in existence. This court went on to say that 
aet~ constituting a declaration of public purposes and 
1naking provisions of ways and 1neans of accomplish-
Inent may be generally classified a~ calling for the exer-
cise of legislative power. This court f~rther stated 
that actions which relate to subjects of a permanent or 
general character are considered to be legislative, while 
those which are temporary in operation and effect are 
not. It was then held that a change in tin1e payment on 
bonds from fifteen years to twenty years was a legis-
lative act and subject to referendum. 
Certainly. in using the tests set forth in the Keigley 
et al. v. Bench case, the zoning ordinance under discus-
sion is a legislative act since the change in the use of 
land is certainly permanent if commercial buildings are 
allowed to be placed thereon, and can hardly be con-
sidered as te1nporary in operation and effect as adminis-
trative acts are considered to be. 
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In 122 A. L. R. 789, the general rule is stated that 
it is generally held that zoning ordinances are within 
the purview of the referendum provisions. 
In the leading California case of Dwyer v. City 
Council of Berkeley, 253 P. 932, where plaintiff was 
petitioning the court for a writ of mandate to cmnpd 
the City Council to either repeal or submit to a referen-
dum vote an ordinance passed by the said City Council 
re-classifying as a business and public use district of 
class 4, certain property designated in the comprehensive 
zoning ordinance of said city as a residential district of 
class 1, wherein stores were not permitted; and where 
plaintiff was a resident, taxpayer and elector of said 
city who o"\vned and resided upon property in the vicinity 
of the property described in said ordinance of re-
cl~ssification, and one of the signers of the referendum 
petition, the court held that the ordinance reclassifying 
the residential property to commercial property was 
a legislative act and subject to referendum. 
In this case the California court was working with 
the Berkeley City Charter which provided that any 
ordinance was subject to initiative or referendum pro-
ceedings. However, the language of the Berkeley City 
Charter is no broader than the provisions in the Consti-
tution of Utah and the Utah State Statute hereinbefore 
referred to. 
The California court then made the following perti-
nent observations: 
A. Only ordinances of a 1nunicipality which involve 
an exercise of the legislative prerogative are subiect to 
the initiative and referendum (page 934). ., 
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B. The court further indicated that if it be conceded 
that the ordinance is loral in character and directly 
affpeh; only a ~mall portion of the population, there is 
nothing· therP('t icnll;.~ inconsistent in P"rmitting the 
eleetoratP of the entire eity to pass upon it by referen-
dum election since the legislative power of the munici-
palit~· resides in the people thereof who simply withdraw 
frmn the legislative body, and reserve to themselves 
the right to execise part of their inherent legislative 
power by the enactment of initiative and referendum 
laws (page 935 ). 
C. The court further stated that it must be pre-
sumed that the electorate will act in the interests of the 
en tire city (page 936). 
D. The court went on to say at page 936 of the 
opinion that the people in each zone are interested not 
only in having a comprehensive zoning law but in what 
that law shall be and that a zoning ordinance as amended 
becomes in effect a different ordinance. 
The Dwyer v. City Council of Berkeley case, supra, 
is a case directly in point insofar as the instant pro-
ceedings are concerned and treats the various argun1ents 
extended against the right of referendum proceedings 
in zoning situations with scholarly care. 
In the case of L. E. Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty 
Company, 3 U. 2d 1, 277 P. 2d 805, at page 808 of the 
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court cited the Dwyer v. City 
Council of Berkeley case, supra, approvingly, and also 
indicated that there are many cases which apply the 
provisions of a referendum act to zoning ordinances. In 
the Dewey case, this court held that zoning by initiative 
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was in effect collaterally attacking the state zoning 
statute and \Yas therefore void. However, no such ob-
jection applies to referendum proceedings reviewing a 
zoning ordinance which has been validly passed by the 
City Council and where the state zoning statute has 
been carefully complied with. 
In the case of I-Iurst v. City of Burlingame, 277 P. 
308, the Supreme Court of California held that a zoning 
ordinance adopted by the electors of the City of Burling-
ame under the initiative law was void since it did not 
comply with the requirements of the state zoning statute 
relating to public hearings. This holding was entirely 
consistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty C01npany, 
supra. At page 312 of the opinion, the court, by way of 
dicta, in distinguishing between the initiative and ref-
erendum provisions as they relate to zoning cases, made 
the following observation: 
" ... it would undoubtedly be conceded that, had 
the board of trustees of the City of Burlingame 
adopted a zoning ordinance, as provided by the 
statute, its final action would be subject to the 
referendum provisions of the constitution and 
laws of the state, for the obvious reason that there 
is embodied in the enactment of a zoning ordin-
ance such ele1nents of legislative action as to 
subject the ordinance when adopted to the re-
served legislative power of the electors of the 
city, when properly invoked, to approve or re-
ject it." 
In the case of Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Com-
pany et al., 97 U. 249, 92 P. 2d 724, the court after 
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referring to various state zoning statutes, made the 
following ohsPrvation at page 726: 
"Independent of the statutory proVIsions refer-
red to a bon·, no one would doubt that the exercise 
of the zoning power is definitely a legislative 
function and activity." 
In the case of Jackson v. Denver Producing and 
Refining Company et al., 96 F. 2d 457, Tenth Circuit 
(Oklahoma 1958), the court held that the chief rxPcutive 
of the city had a duty to cause an ordinance extending 
the limits of an oil and gas district within the city to be 
sub1nitted to the electors at the next general municipal 
election after date on which petition for referendum was 
filed. The court further indicated that the ordinance 
was suspended by the filing of the petition for referen-
dum and remains in abeyance until a vote is had thereon. 
In the case of State ex rei. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 
168 Okla. 632, 37 P. 2d 417, the court held that a zoning 
ordinance extending the limits of an oil and gas district 
within the city is legislative, and not merely administra-
tive, and subject to referendun1. The court went on to say 
that the mere fact that the ordinance will be of great 
benefit is not an urgent reason for its going into effect 
immediately as an emergency measure. The defendant 
contended that the ordinance was administrative in 
character and the court brushed the argument aside as 
'vithout merit. 
In the trial court, respondents relied heavily on the 
following cases : 
A. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W. 2d 713. 
B. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company v. 
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Carl Nadasdy U\linn. 1956), 76 N.W. 2d 670. 
In the Kelley v. John case, the Nebraska court 
holds that a zoning ordinance reclassifying property 
from residential to business is an administrative act and 
not subject to referendum. The court indicates that the 
ordinance passing the comprehensive zoning plan is a 
legislative act and this is the ordinance that should be 
subject to referendun1. The fallacy in this reasoning 
is that the comprehensive zoning ordinance may divide 
the city into districts ''d1ich are agreeable to the people 
of the city. It is only when subsequent action is taken 
by the city council re-zoning certain areas that the 
remedy of referendu1n is desired by the people. The 
people then have a decision to either abide by the dis-
cretionary acts of the city council or to sumbit said 
acts to a vote of the people by way of referendum pro-
ceedings. As stated in the Dwyer v. City Council of 
Berkeley case, supra, at page 936 of the opinion~1a zoning 
ordinance as amended becomes in effect a different 
ordinance." 
r:rhe further contention of the Nebraska court in 
the Kelley v. John case is that if a reclassifying zoning 
ordinance is to be subject to referendun1 proceedings, 
the n1aster plan of the city becon1es a nullity. This 
conclusion is questionable since the n1aster plan is 
merely changed or the effective date delayed pending 
the vote of the people. 
In connection with the :Minneapolis-HoneYwell 
Regulator Company v/ Carl Nadasdy case, supr~, the 
Minnesota court held that the referendun1 provisions of 
the state statute apply only to comprehensive zoning, 
10 
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ordinarwP~ and not to tlH·ir amend1nents. However, this 
was not a <·ourt-Hm<l(· rule since the court indicates at 
page 676 of thP opinion that the controlling state statute 
permit~ the eledor:-; to vote only on the question of the 
..... approval or di~approval of the proposition of permit-
ting the govPrning bod~, to zone the municipality." The 
holding in this <'ase is based squarely on a Minnesota 
statute whirh has no counterpart in the State of Utah. 
It is intere~ting to note that after the I{elley v. John 
case was handed down by the Nebraska court, the smne 
was cited in the Ohio case of I-Iilltop Realt_\', Inc. v. City 
of South Euclid, 16-! N.E. 2d 180, wherein the Ohio court 
held that a reclassification of property from single 
fan1ily use to 1nulti-fan1ily use classification amended 
the cmnprehensive zoning ordinance and was subject to 
referendum. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was 
an adn1inistrative act, and, therefore, not subject to 
referendum and cited the Kelly v. John case. The 
Ohio court responded to this argument at page 181 of 
the opinion as follows: 
"We have read this ease. \~re arP neither per-
suaded by its reasoning nor convinced that the 
applicable laws of Nebraska and Ohio are analo-
gous, as claimed by the plaintiffs." 
The only other case citing the Kelly v John case 
was the Alaba1na ease of Ball v. Jones (1961) 132 So. 2d 
120, which cited the Kelly v. John case in the dissenting 
opinion. In the main opinion, the court said, at page 
123 thereof: 
.. This court in Marshall v. City of Mobile, 250 
Ala. 646, 35 So. 2d 553, recognized the well known 
1 1 
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rule that municipal authorities act in a legislati''l 
capacity in the enactment of zoning ordinance 
Also, the amendment to a comprehensive zonir 
ordiance or a rezoning of a certain area, as w~ 
done in the instant case, becomes a part of tl 
existing comrehensive ordinance and, a fortio 
is a legislative act." 
It should be further pointed out that if responden 
prevail, appellant and others like her will be without 
remedy to review the discretionary acts of the ci1 
council in zoning cases of this type. A hearing befo: 
the Board of Adjustment, as suggested in the Kell{ 
v. John case, would be of little value for the followir 
reasons: 
A. Appellant is not residing in the area rezonE 
and would have no standing for a variance. 
B. A variance ,if possible, would not be the appropJ 
ate remedy since the issue is whether the area should· 
rezoned. 
C. The Board of Adjustment has no authority 
control the discretionary acts of the city council. 
Appellant has no cause of action in the courts 
the state where the discretionary acts of the ci 
council are not confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitra 
as held in the case of Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp< 
ation, 123 U. 107, 255 P. 2d 723. 
Since appellant has neither standing before 1 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Board of Adjustment or the {'Ourts of the state, the 
only r<>nH·d~· lrft i~~ that of referendun1 proc·eedings and 
if rl'~ porHh•td ~ pn·vail in this cal-.~l', appellant and others 
like her are without a rmnedy to review the discretionary 
ad~ of the eity council in zoning cases. 
CONCLUSION 
.Appellant rnaintains that a zoning ordinance re-
classifying property from residential to commercial is 
a legislative act and the proper subject of referendum 
proceedings. 
13 
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